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promises to match the national best bid or offer. However time priority (the order goes to the market or dealer that first displays the best price) is frequently violated. And even price priority can be difficult to maintain if, for example, a large order in one market trades through prices in another market. Certain new electronic markets do not promise to match the best price elsewhere.
The call for a CLOB, in which national price-time priority would exist, thus has considerable appeal. Such a system would link trading markets so that an investor could send an order to any market and be assured of price-time priority across all markets. This solution sounds simple and fair, but building a new system that links different markets will have undesirable effects, will prove to be unsuccessful in achieving its objectives, and will in the end prove unnecessary.
Downstairs linkage of markets
Most proposed market linkage mechanisms are structured to link downstairs trading floors and trading facilities after a customer order has reached a particular market.
The idea is that a market receiving a customer order would take control of that order, either executing it or sending it via a direct linkage mechanism to another market.
Linking markets by a downstairs linkage mechanism should, however, be questioned for several reasons.
First, requiring trading markets to link up directly is undesirable because it reduces competition among the markets. If markets must belong and conform to a linkage mechanism, innovation and competition among markets are likely to be impaired. Any new technology implemented by a market would have to conform to the linkage, and that would impede innovation.
Second, a downstairs linkage mechanism is unlikely to be successful because no one owns it. It is the common property of the linked markets, but no market has an incentive to improve and update the mechanism. The ITS is a good example of a linkage that has not kept pace with technology. Without a constituency, a linkage mechanism is destined for failure.
We cannot have it both ways. Either we choose one market in which price-time priority applies, or we choose separate competing markets in which strict price-time priority cannot be enforced but for which competition improves efficiency and lowers trading costs.
Upstairs order routing links markets
A third reason for questioning a separate downstairs linkage mechanism is that it is unnecessary. Markets are already linked by brokers' obligations to route orders to the best market. If there is complete transparency with regard to quotes, transaction prices, depth and other features of a market, brokers can readily choose the best market. In other words, markets are linked by the upstairs order routing system and by brokers' best execution obligations. The order routing decision ought to be made by customers (or their brokers), not after the orders have made their way to the bowels of a market.
The linkage provided by upstairs brokers can be incomplete if market transparency is incomplete. Orders cannot be routed correctly if information about quotes and depth is not complete. The solution to this problem is to improve transparency and routing systems, not to build a new linkage mechanism. Improvements in transparency include display of the entire book of limit orders with depth at each price along with information on the quality and speed of past executions. 8 In addition, time of order entry should be provided so that time priority could be adhered to if desired. Given enough information, smart electronic routing systems can automatically send orders to the best market.
Upstairs order routing technology may perfectly link markets, and yet order flow continues in traditional channels. For example many orders are internalized within a brokerage firm and sent to the firm's own market makers or are preferenced to particular market makers with whom the firm has established a relationship. Similarly, on-line brokers may send orders to an ECN that does not necessarily post the best price. The failure to route orders to the best market is not a failure of market linkage but a failure to route orders in a particular way. If it chooses, the SEC can impose order routing obligations on upstairs brokers, but it should move cautiously.
The broker's upstairs routing decision is based on best execution obligations.
Currently brokers are usually obligated to trade market orders at the best price. Brokers that internalize or preference order flow achieve best price by agreeing to send the order to a market maker that promises to match the best price when the order is presented. In other words, a market maker may never post the best price and yet receive designated order flow.
Excessive preferencing or internalization can harm markets. If all order flow were preferenced or internalized, no market maker would have an incentive to narrow the spread to attract orders because a better price would simply be matched by other market makers and would fail to attract additional orders. On the other hand, preferencing permits brokers to build long-term wholesale business arrangements with particular markets and market makers. Such arrangements are convenient and cost saving. Markets currently permit preferencing. Indeed preferencing is central to the way order flow is distributed.
Strict price-time priority
The rules under which upstairs brokers route orders determine how closely markets are linked and whether preferencing is possible. Some observers advocate strict price-time priority across markets, at least for small orders. 
Best posted price rule
A middle ground between matching the best price and strict price-time priority is a requirement to route orders to the market posting the best price. 10 This best-price rule would eliminate price matching as is typical for preferenced order flow. Market makers could not step up for orders they like and refuse to step up for orders they dislike. Any market or market maker wishing to receive preferenced order flow would be required publicly to post the best price for all orders, not only those preferenced to it.
To illustrate the current order routing process, consider four market centers, two The best-price routing rule would apply only if the market guarantees execution of the trade in the amount at least equal to the customer's order size. The trade must be guaranteed, for a customer does not wish to route an order to a market only to find that it is rejected. Operationally, a guarantee of execution would require automatic execution of orders.
12 10 Douglas Engman (March 24, 2000) has proposed such an order routing rule for options markets in place of a downstairs linkage. 11 U.S. SEC (July 28, 2000) , page 7. However, Smith(1999) has shown that, in contrast to customer order flow, interdealer trading on SelectNet is sensitive to quotes. 12 Any effective downstairs market linkage plan would also require automatic execution of orders sent from one market to another (which is not now the case for ITS). If a market can return an order, the linkage will expose market makers to double liability because the returned order must be traded and any new orders arriving in the meantime must also be traded. The benefit of the upstairs link is that customers control their own orders. Once customers can send orders to the market with the best price and receive automatic execution, there is no need for a downstairs linkage among markets. Why should orders be sent to an inferior market, which would then route the order elsewhere?
The best-price rule increases the incentive to post good prices. First, there is a better chance that posting a good price will attract order flow because order flow is no longer lost to other market makers who simply match prices. In the above example, A and B may receive little or no order flow even though they post the best price. Under a best price rule, they would receive all the order flow if C and D failed to post the best price. Second, because the best-price rule increases the cost of preferencing, fewer orders will be preferenced, and the number of orders responding to good prices will increase. In order to receive preferenced order flow C and D must post the best price and accept all orders. The inability to choose which orders to accept and which to reject raises the cost to C and D of preferencing, making preferencing less attractive. The result is that more orders will interact in the determination of prices, and each market will have a greater incentive to post good prices.
Market orders, limit orders and incentives
Order routing rules affect incentives to place market and limit orders. Market orders have no interest in maintaining time priority. They simply want the best price. The decision to place a limit order and where to place it is, by contrast, affected by a time priority rule. Time priority across markets guarantees that a limit order with time priority will be executed even if placed in a small illiquid market so long as the limit price is reached and the order has time priority. A time priority rule therefore creates incentives to form new markets.
In the absence of time priority, a limit order at the best price may be stranded if sent to an inactive market that is not attracting market orders. Returning to the preceding example, suppose A has time priority over B at price $20, but market orders prefer the service provided by B. The limit order in A will not trade since market orders are routed to B. Consequently limit orders are less likely to be placed in the inactive market A. Strict price-time priority imposed across markets would protect limit orders in inactive markets like A and hence would artificially encourage the formation of new markets. A new market need only attract limit orders or dealer quotes, and it will, by the time priority rule, attract market orders. In effect, all other markets would protect the limit order in the new market.
If time priority is not required, limit order traders will be encouraged to assess the overall liquidity of the market in which the limit order is placed. If the market does not also attract market orders, the limit order will be stranded. A best price rule without time priority therefore creates incentives for individual markets to be attractive to market orders as well as limit orders, for market order will attract limit orders. Time priority within a market is reasonable and helps attract limit orders, but time priority across markets fragments trading because it encourages new markets.
Effect on commissions and fees
Price-time priority rules are based on execution prices, but the net price paid or received by a trader depends also on commissions and fees. Stricter price and time priority rules may create incentives to charge fees and commissions and may alter how transaction costs are split between the bid-ask spread and commissions. The best-price rule proposed above improves incentives to quote good prices thereby narrowing the bid ask spread. At the same time the rule increases the cost of attracting preferenced order flow since the best price must be offered to all comers not just to preferencing customers.
Market C in the above example could react to the rule in two steps. First it may decide to raise its quote from 19 7/8 to $20 to become eligible to receive order flow. Second it could also charge an order handling fee of 1/8 that could be discounted for preferenced order flow. The discount would reflect the economies of handling order flow from the same customer. Thus, stricter price priority rules do not necessarily reduce trading costs.
A reduced spread may show up in fees or commissions.
Despite the possibility that overall trading costs are not reduced, there are three arguments in favor of the best price rule. First, and most important, the best price rule is desirable because it encourages all orders to interact in the determination of prices. Under a system of preferencing, preferenced volume does not participate in price determination.
It is simply priced to match the price determined elsewhere. When the best price must be posted to attract order flow, market prices will more accurately reflect all current demand and supply. Second, it is better to have costs explicitly reflected in fees or commissions rather than buried in the bid-ask spread. Transparency of fees will make competition more effective. Third, it may be difficult to raise fees sufficiently to offset the tighter spreads, so that total costs may be forced down.
Dealers and customers
Modern technology equalizes the position of customers and dealers. The behavior and economic incentives of an active institutional trader or a day trader are much like those of a market maker. If markets are to be linked effectively, order routing among markets should be available to public customers and to professionals on equal terms. In return they receive privileged access to order flow and to information about market conditions. They are disadvantaged in that they do not have time priority vis-à-vis public orders. Technology, transparency and increased access reduce the distinction between upstairs and downstairs traders. In electronic markets, upstairs traders can sometimes trade faster than downstairs dealers. Regulatory policy will need to respond to new technology, not by imposing obligations or limitations on all traders, but by reducing obligations on designated dealers while at the same time eliminating special privileges of designated dealers.
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Summary and implications
There is little need for a downstairs market linkage mechanism. A linkage mechanism connecting markets must impede competition if it is to work effectively.
Markets are already linked by upstairs order routing systems. If there is a problem with linkages, we should look toward improving the current upstairs linkages by increasing transparency and improving upstairs routing systems. An implication of this approach is that ITS be allowed to wither away and that a formal linkage mechanism for options markets, such as recently approved by the SEC, is not necessary.
The issue for regulators is the rules, if any, that should be imposed on brokers in routing their orders. Regulators may want to specify more clearly best execution rules for upstairs brokers. Regulators need not require a new linkage system. Any desired linkage can be accomplished by specifying upstairs order routing rules.
Order routing according to strict price-time priority across markets goes too far.
However requiring orders to be sent to a market with the best posted price is reasonable.
Such a rule would eliminate the option that now exists for market makers to match the best price for orders they wish to execute and to fail to match the best price for orders they do not wish to execute. The best-price rule would only apply to orders of size that can be guaranteed execution by the market. The best-price rule makes preferencing more difficult, for a market maker must be ready to trade at the posted price vis-à-vis all comers, not just vis-à-vis preferenced orders. To the extent there is a decline in preferenced order flow, more orders will interact in price determination.
